The Second Payment Services Directive did something no banking law had done before: it turned a bank account into an API that a third party can call. Since PSD2 took effect, a licensed fintech in the European Union can, with the account holder's explicit consent, read the transactions on a payment account and initiate payments from it — without a contract with the bank and without ever seeing the customer's password. Three new regulated roles carry that access: the payment initiation service provider (PISP), which moves money; the account information service provider (AISP), which reads it; and the card-based payment instrument issuer (CBPII), which asks the bank whether funds are available.
The United States is on a different clock. Section 1033 of the Dodd-Frank Act gives consumers the right to their own financial data in a usable electronic form, and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau wrote the rule implementing it in October 2024 — then a federal court enjoined its enforcement a year later while the Bureau reconsiders it. A company building open-banking integrations in 2026 is building across two regimes at once: a mature, enforced access regime in the EU and the UK, and a paused, contested one in the US.
The access model: Articles 66, 67, and 68
Directive (EU) 2015/2366, adopted 25 November 2015, writes the access rules as obligations on the bank. Article 66 gives the payer the right to use a PISP — except where the payment account is not accessible online. The PISP must not hold the payer's funds, must not store sensitive payment data, must not request data beyond what the service needs, must not modify the amount, the payee, or any other feature of the transaction, and must identify itself to the account servicing payment service provider (ASPSP) on every payment it initiates. The ASPSP must communicate securely with the PISP, must provide all information on the initiation and execution of the transaction immediately after receipt of the payment order, and must treat PISP-transmitted orders without discrimination other than for objective reasons.
Article 67 does the same for account information services. The AISP acts only on the user's explicit consent, accesses only the information from designated payment accounts and associated payment transactions, does not request sensitive payment data, and does not use data for any purpose other than the service explicitly requested. Articles 66(5) and 67(4) then remove the commercial gate entirely: neither service shall depend on a contractual relationship between the TPP and the ASPSP.
The bank's one real lever is Article 68(5): an ASPSP may deny a TPP access for objectively justified and duly evidenced reasons relating to unauthorised or fraudulent access. It must inform the payer of the reasons, where possible before access is denied, and must immediately report the incident to the competent authority. A denial without evidence, or one never reported, is not a security decision — it is a breach of the access duty. The same article lets payer and bank agree spending limits, and lets the bank block an instrument for objectively justified security reasons.
Strong customer authentication and the exemption ladder
Article 97 requires strong customer authentication (SCA) — two or more elements from knowledge, possession, and inherence — every time a payer accesses a payment account online, initiates an electronic payment transaction, or acts through a remote channel that may imply a risk of payment fraud. For remote transactions the authentication must dynamically link amount and payee. The detail sits in Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/389, the RTS on SCA and secure communication, which applies from 14 September 2019.
The RTS then builds the exemption ladder — the cases where a provider may choose not to apply SCA. Every exemption correctly claimed is a transaction that completes without a challenge; every one wrongly claimed is a compliance breach:
| Exemption | RTS article | Test | Authority |
|---|---|---|---|
| Contactless at point of sale | Art. 11 | ≤ €50 single; ≤ €150 cumulative or ≤ 5 consecutive since last SCA | Regulation (EU) 2018/389, Art. 11 |
| Low-value remote | Art. 16 | ≤ €30 single; ≤ €100 cumulative or ≤ 5 consecutive since last SCA | Regulation (EU) 2018/389, Art. 16 |
| Trusted beneficiaries | Art. 13 | Payee on a list the payer created with SCA | Regulation (EU) 2018/389, Art. 13 |
| Recurring transactions | Art. 14 | Same amount, same payee; SCA on creation and first initiation | Regulation (EU) 2018/389, Art. 14 |
| Same-person transfers | Art. 15 | Payer and payee the same person, same ASPSP | Regulation (EU) 2018/389, Art. 15 |
| Secure corporate processes | Art. 17 | Dedicated non-consumer protocols the authority accepts as equivalent | Regulation (EU) 2018/389, Art. 17 |
| Transaction risk analysis | Art. 18 | Fraud rate at or below the Annex reference rate; amount at or below the ETV | Regulation (EU) 2018/389, Arts. 18–20 |
The UK kept PSD2 in domestic law after Brexit. From 15 October 2021 the UK contactless limit rose to £100 single and £300 cumulative (FCA Policy Statement 21/2). Then, on 19 March 2026, the FCA removed the fixed £100 cap — issuers now set their own limits, and most banks still hold £100. Hard-coding £100 as a regulatory ceiling is now wrong in the UK, and hard-coding €50 is wrong for any UK card.
The account-information side has its own clock. Under Article 10 of the RTS, an AISP may access the balance and the last 90 days of transactions without SCA, except on first access and except where more than 90 days have elapsed since the last access with SCA. Under Article 36(5), where the user is not actively requesting the information, the AISP may pull it at most four times in a 24-hour period.
Transaction risk analysis: the fraud-rate math
Article 18 is the exemption that rewards good fraud controls with money. A payment service provider may skip SCA on a remote electronic payment transaction identified as low risk, provided its fraud rate for that transaction type is at or below the Annex reference rate, the amount does not exceed the exemption threshold value (ETV) for that band, and real-time risk analysis has not identified any of six factors: abnormal spending or behaviour, unusual device or software information, malware in the session, a known fraud scenario, an abnormal payer location, or a high-risk payee location. The Annex sets three bands for each transaction type:
| ETV | Remote electronic card-based payments | Remote electronic credit transfers |
|---|---|---|
| €100 | 0.13% | 0.015% |
| €250 | 0.06% | 0.01% |
| €500 | 0.01% | 0.005% |
Article 19 defines the fraud rate: the total value of unauthorised or fraudulent remote transactions, whether recovered or not, divided by the total value of all remote transactions for the same type, on a rolling 90-day basis — counting transactions authenticated with SCA and those executed under any exemption. A PSP processes €3,500,000 of remote card-based payments in a rolling quarter and records €4,200 of unauthorised or fraudulent remote card transactions:
At 0.12%, the PSP is below the 0.13% reference rate for the €100 band and may exempt card transactions up to €100 — but it is above the 0.06% rate for the €250 band, so a €200 transaction must go through SCA. To clear the €250 band on the same volume, fraud must fall to €2,100 or less; to clear the €500 band, to €350. A single €3,000 fraud on a €2,500,000 quarter is 0.12% on its own, so a small portfolio lives or dies on individual cases.
Article 20 is the tripwire. A PSP using the TRA exemption must immediately report to the competent authority when a monitored fraud rate exceeds the applicable reference rate, and must immediately cease using the exemption in the affected range if the rate exceeds the reference rate for two consecutive quarters — and may not resume until the rate has been at or below the reference rate for one quarter, with evidence of restored compliance. The methodology, the model, and the reported fraud rates are audited at least yearly, and in the first year of TRA use — and at least every three years after — by an independent external auditor.
The US: Section 1033, a rule on pause
The American statute is older than PSD2 and shorter. Section 1033 of the Dodd-Frank Act, codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5533, provides that a covered person shall make available to a consumer, upon request, information concerning the consumer financial product or service the consumer obtained from it — including transaction and account data, costs, charges, and usage data — in an electronic form usable by consumers. It excepts confidential commercial information (including a credit-score algorithm), information collected to prevent fraud or money laundering, information another law keeps confidential, and information the covered person cannot retrieve in the ordinary course of business. It imposes no duty to maintain records. Subsection (d) directs the Bureau to prescribe standards for standardised, machine-readable data formats.
The rule implementing it, the CFPB's Personal Financial Data Rights rule, was finalised on 22 October 2024 and published at 89 FR 90838 on 18 November 2024, effective 17 January 2025, with tiered compliance dates beginning 1 April 2026 for the largest data providers. Forcht Bank, the Kentucky Bankers Association, and the Bank Policy Institute sued on the day the rule was finalised (Forcht Bank, N.A. v. CFPB, No. 5:24-cv-304, E.D. Ky.). After the change of administration the CFPB itself told the court the rule was unlawful and should be set aside, then moved on 29 July 2025 to stay the case while it opened a new rulemaking. On 29 October 2025 the court enjoined the CFPB from enforcing the rule until that reconsideration is complete, and on 22 August 2025 the Bureau published an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (90 FR 40986). As of November 2026 the rule remains in 12 CFR Part 1033, unvacated, and no data provider is presently required to meet a Section 1033 deadline. The Financial Data Exchange (FDX) is the only CFPB-recognised standard-setting body.
Build it: the integration checklist
The engineering follows the law in this order.
- Get authorised as a TPP. AISP, PISP, or both, with the home-state competent authority; passport the authorisation across the EEA. The licence determines which APIs you may call — an AISP licence does not authorise payment initiation.
- Stand up the identification. TPPs identify themselves to each ASPSP with qualified eIDAS certificates, verified before any data flows. Certificate expiry is an outage: calendar it like a domain renewal.
- Build to the dedicated interface. The RTS requires each ASPSP with online-accessible payment accounts to offer at least one access interface enabling secure communication with AISPs, PISPs, and CBPII providers. Test against the ASPSP's sandbox first, then the fallback interface, and record which ASPSPs expose which interface — the quality varies widely, and the variance is a product decision. On the wire, the Berlin Group's NextGenPSD2 framework is a REST API exchanging JSON: the TPP calls the ASPSP's endpoints with the IBAN in the path, and card-based SCA runs through EMV 3-D Secure (3DS2). Onboarding still means KYC and AML checks at the ASPSP.
- Implement consent as a first-class record. Explicit consent per account, per service, scoped to designated accounts and their transactions. Store the consent, its scope, its grant time, and its revocation — and make revocation immediate: an AISP that keeps pulling after revocation breaches Article 67(2)(f).
- Wire the SCA exemptions into the transaction router. The router checks, in order: trusted beneficiary, recurring series, same-person transfer, low-value counters (€30/€100/5), contactless counters (€50/€150/5), corporate protocols, then TRA band by live fraud rate. Counters reset on SCA, per instrument.
- Run the fraud-rate pipeline. Rolling 90-day fraud rates per transaction type, computed the Article 19 way — fraud value over total value, recovered or not — with alerts at 80% of each reference rate and a hard stop at the rate itself. Under Article 20, a missed alert is a forced shutdown of the exemption.
- Schedule the audits. Annual audit of the TRA methodology, model, and reported fraud rates; independent external audit in the first year of TRA use and at least every three years after.
Founder & CEO Insight — Enow A. Jovial
Who this is not for
This playbook is for a licensed or licensable TPP, a bank building its dedicated interface, or a merchant whose checkout depends on PSD2 exemptions. It is not for a company that wants to scrape bank websites: screen scraping is not an access model under PSD2, and Articles 66 and 67 assume a regulated TPP on a dedicated interface. It is also not a US launch plan — the Section 1033 rule is enjoined.
The interfaces around this one decide how far the access reaches: Mercury vs Relay vs Wise for the accounts the TPPs connect to, Wise vs OFX vs Xe for the cross-border transfers a PISP can initiate, and Stripe vs Square vs PayPal for the card processing that still carries most remote payments. Price the cross-border leg through the currency converter before quoting a PISP-initiated transfer in euros.
